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weighting. For the purposes of this article, we use the 
HWWI commodity price index, which is the most relevant 
index for the advanced countries  (1).
During the ﬁ  rst half of the 1990s, commodity prices were 
relatively  stable  overall.  During  the  second  half  of  the 
decade and up to 2002, the global commodity price index 
recorded a small increase on average, the rising energy 
prices being offset by falling prices of other commodities. 
However,  this  overall  picture  conceals  the  widespread 
decline in commodity prices in 1998, in the context of 
the Asia crisis, and the sudden increase in oil prices which 
accompanied the global economic revival in the period 
1999-2000, causing a surge in the global index.
From 2003 until 2006, commodity prices increased sig-
niﬁ  cantly  year  by  year,  with  a  few  exceptions,  notably 
foodstuffs. Thus, over this period, the global commod-
ity index increased by around 24 p.c. per annum. Prices 
of energy raw materials rose by 26 p.c., driven mainly 
by  the  movement  in  oil  prices  (2),  while  industrial  raw 
materials prices increased by 22 p.c. as a result of the 
higher cost of metals. Food prices rose by only 7.7 p.c. 
over the period considered. During the ﬁ  rst six months 
Introduction
The  movement  in  commodity  prices  is  of  considerable 
importance for the world economy. The recent price rises, 
particularly the rise in oil prices, thus triggered fears of 
substantial  adverse  effects  for  the  importing  countries, 
owing to the use of these products as factors of produc-
tion  and  as  consumption  goods.  Moreover,  for  many 
developing countries, commodity exports make a consid-
erable contribution to GDP and to public ﬁ  nances. Finally, 
the soaring prices of raw materials have exacerbated the 
problem of global imbalances.
The  ﬁ  rst  section  of  this  article  gives  a  brief  historical 
account of the movement in nominal and real prices of 
commodities.  The  second  section  examines  the  factors 
behind  the  recent  rise  in  the  prices  of  raw  materials. 
The next section examines the economic implications of 
that price rise. A number of empirical studies have been 
conducted to measure the inﬂ  uence in various regions of 
the recent steep increase in oil prices. This article focuses 
primarily on the effects of the oil shock for the oil-import-
ing  countries.  Finally,  the  last  two  sections  present  the 
short- and long-term outlook for commodity prices and 
the economic policy implications.
1.    Commodity price developments
Various  bodies  calculate  a  commodity  price  index 
which  they  publish  at  regular  intervals  (HWWI,  IMF, 
CRB,  Goldman  Sachs,  etc.).  These  indices  differ  from 
one  another  in  the  commodities  selected  and  in  their   
(1)    The weight of the various commodities in the global index is based on their 
relative importance in the total commodity imports of the OECD countries 
(excluding trade within the EU). It was recently updated to take account of the 
increased signiﬁ  cance of crude oil in imports. Energy raw materials represent 
roughly 67 p.c. of the global index (63 p.c. for oil alone), whereas the share of 
industrial raw materials is around 23 p.c. and that of food products 10 p.c. The 
HWWI institute excludes natural gas from the index because there is no available 
series of world prices of natural gas.
(2)    Natural gas prices have moved broadly in line with the prices of petroleum 
products on the main markets. Thus, between 2003 and 2006 they increased by 
an average of 33.7 p.c. per annum in Europe and 24.3 p.c. in the United States. 
Those movements are due to the opportunities for substitution between natural 
gas and petroleum products, and the fact that natural gas prices are mostly 
indexed contractually to petroleum product prices.
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of 2007,   commodity prices increased by an average of 
3.1 p.c. compared to the corresponding period of 2006. 
The sustained strong rise in the prices of non-fuel com-
modities was partly offset by a fall in prices of energy 
raw materials.
Therefore, taking account of the weight of the various 
commodities in the global index, it is evident that energy 
raw materials, and particularly oil, made the largest con-
tribution to the rise in that index in recent years. However, 
in 2006 and in the ﬁ  rst six months of 2007, industrial raw 
material prices shared in the rise in the global index to a 
greater extent than in previous years, owing to the strong 
increase in prices of non-ferrous metals.
In the light of these developments and the relative impor-
tance  of  the  various  commodities  in  advanced  country 
imports, the analysis which follows concentrates on the 
causes  and  effects  of  the  recent  rise  in  oil  and  metal 
prices.
Over the period 2003-2006, the price of a barrel of Brent 
increased by an average of around 27 p.c. each year  (1). 
The price per barrel stood at 66 dollars in 2006, compared 
to only 25 dollars in 2002. In a historical perspective, the 
recent oil price rise in nominal terms has not exceeded 
the scale of the oil shocks of the 1970s. Between 1972 
and 1974, i.e. in the space of just two years, the price 
of a barrel of Brent rose by 258 p.c. By comparison, oil 
prices climbed by 164 p.c. between 2002 and 2006, a rise 
equivalent to that seen between 1978 and 1980 at the 
time of the second oil shock. However, the price increase 
recorded over the period 2002-2006 was more gradual. 
Oil  price  levels  are  well  above  those  attained  in  the 
1970s, and at the beginning of August 2006, in a con-
text of Middle East tension, the price of a barrel of Brent 
reached a record high of almost 80 dollars. Subsequently, 
the Brent price fell sharply and, as a monthly average, 
remained below the 60 dollar mark until February 2007, 
except for a brief surge in December 2006. In June 2007, 
the price per barrel once again exceeded 70 dollars. The 
tense situation on the oil market consequently generated 
great price volatility.
In real terms, by 2005 oil prices had exceeded the level 
reached in 1974, though were still below the levels seen 
in the early 1980s. The price per barrel would have to go 
beyond the 90 dollar mark to be comparable in real terms 
to the 1980 level.
During the second half of the 1990s, prices of all metals 
declined on average (except for the price of iron ore). The 
trend was reversed from 2003, when the rise in metal 
prices  became  widespread.  As  a  result,  prices  of  the 
majority  of  metals  reached  historical  peaks.  The  global 
index of metal prices rose by around 30 p.c. per annum 
on average over the period 2003-2006. The movement in 
(1)    The Brent price is generally used as a benchmark worldwide, though the volume 
traded is well below the ﬁ  gure for Saudi Arabian, for example. According to the 
International Petroleum Exchange, the Brent price is used to ﬁ  x the price of two-
thirds of world oil sales.
TABLE  1  COMMODITY PRICES
(annual percentage change in US dollar, unless otherwise stated)










Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.3 23.5 14.3 30.4 28.4 21.1 3.1 100.0
Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 –4.6 7.7 8.3 11.7 0.0 10.9 17.9 9.9
Industrial raw materials . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 –5.2 22.3 17.3 24.8 14.5 32.6 23.2 22.6
of which:
Agricultural raw materials . . . . . 3.5 –6.6 11.2 21.8 9.7 1.3 11.8 22.9 10.1
Non-ferrous metals . . . . . . . . . . . –0.3 –4.8 31.1 12.0 36.8 16.0 59.8 28.0 9.1
Ferrous metals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 –1.4 27.7 18.0 38.6 38.2 16.1 13.2 3.4
Energy raw materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 7.0 26.3 14.4 35.3 36.5 19.1 –3.8 67.4
of which:
Crude oil (Brent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 9.0 27.1 15.2 30.8 42.3 20.1 –4.5 62.7
Source: HWWI.
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the index was inﬂ  uenced mainly by the soaring prices of 
aluminium and copper, which have the highest weight in 
the index. In 2006, the aluminium price rose by an annual 
average of 35 p.c., while the price of copper went up by 
more than 80 p.c. Nonetheless, certain other metals such 
as zinc posted record price increases and thus contributed, 
although to a lesser extent, to the rise in the index. The 
price  rise  was  maintained  over  the  ﬁ  rst  six  months  of 
2007, and even gathered pace for a number of metals 
such as tin, lead and nickel.
Deﬂ  ated  by  the  United  States’  consumer  price  index, 
metal prices declined by an average of 1.5 p.c. per annum 
over the period 1971-2002. That downward trend is usu-
ally attributed to major productivity gains in the metal-
lurgy sector relative to other sectors of the economy, but 
also to the development of certain synthetic substitutes. 
Prices started to rise in 2003.
2.    Factors behind the recent rise in 
commodity prices
It is essential to comprehend the causes of the recent rise 
in commodity prices, since the nature of the “shock” may 
inﬂ  uence both the persistence of the high price level or 
the rise in prices of raw materials, and its impact on the 
economy.
2.1    The oil shocks in a historical perspective
In recent years, attention has focused mainly on oil price 
movements, owing to lasting memories of the disastrous 
effects of the oil shocks of the 1970s.
The  recent  oil  price  rise  therefore  needs  to  be  placed 
in  perspective  with  the  shocks  recorded  in  the  past 
few decades. Up to 1973, oil was a cheap commodity, 
facilitating the economic expansion of the United States 
and  European  countries.  The  Yom  Kippur  war  in  1973 
triggered  the  ﬁ  rst  oil  shock :  the  OPEC  embargo  on 
western  countries  which  supported  Israel  caused  the 
price to quadruple in the space of a few months. The 
Iranian revolution in 1979, and the start of the Iran-Iraq 
war in September 1980, caused the second oil shock fol-
lowing  the  substantial  reduction  in  exports  from  those 
countries. The escalating oil price had two effects : on the 
supply side, it opened up the market to oil from sources 
which had become economically viable, mainly Mexico, 
Alaska and the North Sea ; on the demand side, it caused 
sharper cuts in consumption via economy measures and 
diversiﬁ  cation.
Following the increase in OPEC output in 1985, oil prices 
were relatively stable until the late 1990s, with only a few 
episodes of high volatility : one in 1990 and 1991 as a result 



























































































































































































CHART 1  NOMINAL AND REAL PRICES OF BRENT AND METALS
  (monthly averages, US dollar)
Sources : BLS, IMF, Thomson Financial Datastream.
(1)  Deflated by the United States' CPI.
Nominal
Real (1)
PRICE OF A BARREL OF BRENT 
METAL PRICES
(index 1970 = 100)
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ﬁ  nancial  crisis  in  the  south-east  Asian  countries,  which 
led to a steep price fall, and ﬁ  nally a “mini” oil shock in 
1999 and 2000, when the price of crude tripled between 
February 1999 and October 2000, owing to a revival in 
global demand for oil combined with a decline in output.
While the ﬁ  rst two oil shocks were caused by a break in 
oil production, there is a broad consensus attributing the 
steady rise in crude prices from 2002 – sometimes called 
the “third oil shock” – primarily to demand-side factors : 
not only the purely cyclical upswing in global growth, but 
also and more particularly the quickening integration of a 
substantial proportion of the world’s population into the 
economy and world trade. The explosion in demand for 
oil in the emerging economies, and especially in China, 
is not due only to the economic growth seen in those 
countries but also to an economic structure centred very 
much on industry – often less efﬁ  cient in its use of energy 
than the OECD countries as a whole – and the increase 
in private use of motor vehicles. The strong growth of 
world trade may also have contributed to the substantial 
oil consumption, owing to the accompanying increase in 
demand for air and sea transport.
These economic factors are supplemented by a combina-
tion of geopolitical and technical factors. Centres of ten-
sion in the oil-producing countries, mainly in the Middle 
East, were a major contributor to the rapid rise in crude 
oil prices. Other producers – Venezuela, Chad, Russia and 
Nigeria – are also in an “uncomfortable” political situ-
ation, and market operators keep an anxious watch on 
developments in those countries. In that context, having 
regard  to  the  fears  of  supply  disruption,  precautionary 
demand  and  speculative  demand  have  most  certainly 
increased.  In  recent  years,  supply  disruption  caused  by 
wars or weather conditions have further exacerbated the 
tension on the oil market.
2.2    Geographical trend in demand for commodities
The emerging economies, and particularly China, occupy 
an increasingly important position in world oil consump-
tion. Although global demand for oil is still dominated 
by the advanced countries, headed by the United States, 
its expansion has been far more rapid in the emerging 
countries,  except  for  the  region  of  the  former  Soviet 
Union which suffered an economic collapse for much of 
the 1990s.
Global demand for oil expanded at an annual average 
rate of 1.4 p.c. between 1992 and 2001. Demand was 
most dynamic in Asia, essentially in China, where it was 
sustained  by  exceptional  economic  growth,  averaging 
over 10 p.c. per annum. The expansion of global con-
sumption of oil gathered pace in 2003, and especially in 
2004 when it reached its highest growth rate since 1977, 
namely  4  p.c.  Except  for  Japan,  all  economic  regions 
increased  their  demand  for  oil,  particularly  the  United 
States (+4 p.c. in 2004, or 900,000 barrels per day) and 
China (+16 p.c., or 900,000 barrels per day). This demand 
peak was unexpected : in January 2004, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) had predicted an increase in demand 
of  only  1.6  p.c.  for  2004.  In  the  case  of  China,  there 
were some temporary factors causing the demand surge, 
namely electricity supply disruption which encouraged the 
use of new, more reliable diesel-operated electricity gen-
erators, and the expansion of oil stocks in 2004. Together, 
China and the United States thus accounted for 56 p.c. of 
the 2004 increase in demand. In 2005 and 2006, demand 
for  oil  increased  at  a  more  moderate  pace  of  around 
1 p.c. In 2006, the OECD countries actually reduced their 
demand for oil. This contraction was due in particular to 
the high level of stocks in the advanced economies, the 
economic slowdown in the United States and the mild 
winter. However, structural factors could also have played 
a role, e.g. the substitution of oil by natural gas.
Despite  China’s  vigorous  demand  in  recent  years,  that 
country’s  oil  consumption  is  still  relatively  modest.  In 
that regard, it should be pointed out that China is still 
extremely dependent on coal  (1) for its energy. It is in fact 
the world’s biggest producer and consumer of coal.
These tendencies are also evident on other basic product 
markets. On the metal markets, the main global consum-
ers  are  Europe  (in  the  broad  sense),  the  United  States 
and  emerging  Asia,  especially  China.  Over  the  period 
1993-2002, annual growth of world metal consumption 
averaged  between  1.3  and  4.4  p.c.,  depending  on  the 
metal. In the period 2002-2005, the rise in the consump-
tion of the majority of metals accelerated. The steepest 
increases were recorded for tin, aluminium and steel, with 
consumption for these three metals rising on average by 
around 8 p.c. The strong expansion of Chinese consump-
tion, especially since the early years of this century, is evi-
dent for all basic metals. Since 2005, the level of Chinese 
consumption has caught up with the European level for 
various  metals,  including  aluminium,  copper  and  steel. 
The scale of the Chinese iron and steel industry requires 
a corresponding quantity of iron ore. China is already the 
largest iron ore consumer and producer – as well as being 
the leading importer of that commodity – and has become 
the world’s biggest steel producer. Although it has also 
become the leading consumer of aluminium, China con-
tinues to export this commodity ; this is part of the reason 
(1)    In 2004, coal accounted for almost 62 p.c. of China’s total primary energy 
consumption, while oil represented only 19 p.c. 
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why the rise in aluminium prices has been more modest 
compared to the price of copper, which is in very short 
supply in China. The World Bank (2006b) considers that, 
in a few years’ time, China will far outstrip Europe and will 
become the biggest consumer of all industrial metals.
Historical trends suggest that metal consumption increases 
in parallel with incomes, during the period of industri-
alisation and development of the domestic infrastructure. 
Beyond  a  certain  income  threshold,  growth  generally 
tends more towards the service sector, so that metal con-
sumption begins to stagnate. So far, China seems to have 
followed the tendencies seen in Japan in its initial devel-
opment phase, except for certain metals where per capita 
consumption in China is higher for a comparable income 
level. One of the reasons is that the Chinese industrial 
sector represents a much larger proportion of GDP than 
would generally be expected in a country at that stage 
of  development.  According  to  the  IMF  (2006b),  that 
situation is due both to historical reasons (the formerly 
centralised economies had a high level of industrialisa-
tion) and to the relocation of manufacturing production 
from the advanced economies and other emerging Asian 
economies to China.
The  said  structural  changes  on  the  demand  side  could 
have  a  more  lasting  impact  on  prices,  depending  on 
whether  Asian  growth  is  sustained  by  a  process  of 
economic catching up, rather than by the international 
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CHART 2  REGIONAL DEMAND FOR OIL AND METALS
Sources : IEA, World Bank.
(1)  The regional breakdown differs from that used for metals.
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2.3    Characteristics of oil and metal supplies
The  strong  growth  of  demand  does  not  on  its  own 
account for the soaring oil prices : in 2005 and 2006, the 
expansion of oil consumption was weaker, but prices have 
never been as high (in nominal terms). On the supply side, 
the main oil market player is OPEC  (1) – which currently 
supplies 41 p.c. of the world’s oil and owns 70 p.c. of 
the proven oil reserves. OPEC’s power became apparent 
primarily in the early 1980s  (2). After that, in the face of 
competition  from  oil-producing  countries  that  are  not 
members of OPEC and which took immediate advantage 
of its actions to develop their own production, it became 
increasingly difﬁ  cult for the cartel to apply its quota policy 
effectively. So, production-cutting agreements are occa-
sionally extended beyond OPEC’s boundaries to include 
major  non-member  producers  such  as  Russia,  Mexico, 
Kazakhstan,  Oman  and  Norway.  At  the  end  of  2006, 
OPEC decided to cut back its production on two occa-
sions, the last cut having been implemented in February 
2007  (3), exerting upward pressure on oil prices.
The historically high growth of demand for oil recorded in 
2004 highlighted a situation of tension on the oil market. 
In that year, the expansion of output outside OPEC was 
curbed  by  climatic  factors  (particularly  in  the  United 
States), but also by a structural decline in output in the 
United Kingdom and Norway, so that it was insufﬁ  cient 
to cope with the consumption boom. Consequently, the 
OPEC  countries  adopted  an  accommodating  attitude 
towards  this  surge  in  demand,  by  producing  at  more 
or less full capacity until the end of 2004. The level of 
output  by  non-OPEC  countries  hardly  changed  in  the 
following year  (4)  and the “call on OPEC” – i.e. the OPEC 
supply supplementing that of other countries to cope with 
demand – prolonged the cartel’s high rate of output. The 
unused production capacity thus dropped to an all-time 
low, increasing the sensitivity of prices to any event affect-
ing or threatening oil supplies.
The shortage of excess production capacity partly reﬂ  ects 
the lack of investment during the 1990s, following the 
low level of real oil prices, on average, over the period 
1985-2000. The easing of oil market tension is basically 
dependent  on  the  supply  in  an  industry  featuring  very 
long investment cycles (ﬁ  ve to ten years). However, both 
international  and  national  oil  companies  seem  to  be 
adopting a cautious approach towards new investment. 
In the case of the international oil companies, there are 
several factors restraining the expansion of investment  (5) :
(1)    Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates and Venezuela. In 2007, Angola became the twelfth member of 
OPEC.
(2)    When the price of oil remained high even when demand was falling or 
stagnating owing to the global economic recession and supply was rising sharply 
with the large-scale development of oil reserves outside OPEC. Throughout 
this period, OPEC delayed the decline in oil prices signiﬁ  cantly by introducing 
production quotas.
(3)    OPEC decided to reduce its production from November 2006 with 1.2 million of 
barrels per day and from February 2007 to reduce it further with 0.5 million of 
barrels per day.
(4)    Owing to the decline in production in Russia – particularly in the Yukos oilﬁ  elds – 
and in the United States as a result of the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina 
in August 2005.
































































































CHART 3  TOTAL OIL DEMAND AND SUPPLY
  (millions of barrels per day)
































































































CHART 4  OPEC’S UNUSED PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  (millions of barrels per day)
Source : IMF.
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–    limited access to the reserves of oil-rich countries asso-
ciated  with  regulatory  changes  which  cast  doubt  on 
the investment return, and a tendency to nationalise 
resources in some countries. In particular, three Latin 
American countries – Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela – 
have made fundamental changes to the tax rules on 
the oil and gas sector, in order to increase their control 
over the resources. Elsewhere, too, in response to high 
commodity prices, the oil- and gas-exporting countries 
have tended to guarantee the State a larger share of 
the proﬁ  ts made by oil companies operating on their 
territory. The process has taken different forms, includ-
ing greater State participation and higher export taxes 
in Russia and Argentina, bigger royalties in Kazakhstan, 
and an increase in tax on the oil companies’ revenue in 
the United Kingdom and Denmark ;
–    in the OECD countries where the international oil com-
panies hold a dominant position, it has become difﬁ  cult 
and expensive to extend the productive life of the exist-
ing oil ﬁ  elds which are in decline ;
–    following  job  cuts  in  the  1990s,  the  lack  of  skilled 
workers is necessitating relatively high expenditure on 
training in the short term ;
–    a  great  volatility  of  oil  prices  hampers  investment 
decisions.
However,  some  major  national  oil  companies,  capable 
of ﬁ  nancing projects themselves and having maintained 
their level of expertise during the decline of the 1990s, 
have developed ambitious plans for expanding produc-
tion capacity at all levels in the supply chain  (1). On the 
other hand, the real investment of the majority of other 
national oil companies has not really recovered since the 
decline of the 1990s, especially as investment in many oil-
producing countries was limited by restrictions imposed 
by the government of those countries, notably via their 
budget plans.
The level of demand for oil combined with the erosion of 
the excess capacity also revealed structural imbalances in 
the oil sector, leading to greater price differentials between 
light and heavy types of crude. Although OPEC adopted 
an  accommodating  attitude  towards  demand,  most  of 
the additional production of OPEC is of the heavier type, 
whereas  world  demand  is  increasingly  shifting  towards 
the light types (for transport)  (2). The shortage of light oil 
was aggravated by a structural imbalance in the reﬁ  ning 
sector. Not only is total reﬁ  ning capacity scarcely higher 
than the level of the 1980s, at 83 million barrels per day in 
2005, and utilisation rates, which have gradually increased 
since 2002, are still over 90 p.c., but furthermore, the 
bulk of the reﬁ  ning capacity consists of simple distillation 
processes which cannot be used to process heavy crude 
(containing a lot of sulphur). Nonetheless, the reﬁ  neries 
can be adapted to deal with this type of crude, though 
the conversion process is expensive and it may take them 
several years to reach the operational stage.
The problem of under-investment also concerns the metal 
sector. For over thirty years, the mining industry has been 
able to produce increasing quantities of metals at gradu-
ally  diminishing  real  cost.  Real  metal  prices  have  thus 
experienced a long period of decline, mainly as a result 
of the technological progress made in the extraction and 
processing of metals. However, the buoyancy of demand 
for metals, particularly Chinese demand, took the indus-
try  by  surprise  and  led  to  a  reduction  in  stock  levels, 
especially as the previous price falls had prompted a lack 
of investment in the metal sector in the late 1990s and 
the early years of this century, and the closure of uneco-
nomic excess capacity. Since then, the sector’s substantial 
income has supported investment spending, which has 
already increased signiﬁ  cantly. However, the rising cost of 
inputs – including energy – and the scarcity of equipment 
and skilled labour have tended to delay some investment 
projects.
2.4    Financial investors and dynamism of 
the commodity markets
In recent years, basic products seem to have become an 
attractive  ﬁ  nancial  investment.  The  commodity  futures 
markets have become much deeper over the years, and 
the presence of ﬁ  nancial investors on those markets has 
rapidly  increased.  Thus,  participation  in  the  New  York 
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) – measured by the number 
of  contracts  recorded  by  the  US  Commodity  Futures 
Trading Commission – has quadrupled since 1995. The 
total number of futures contracts on the oil markets came 
to almost 2 million in 2006, and the proportion of non-
commercial contracts increased from 9 p.c. in 1995 to 
16 p.c. in 2006 (IMF, 2006b). As pointed out by Domanski 
and  Heath  (2007),  the  markets  in  basic  products  are 
now increasingly similar to ﬁ  nancial markets in terms of 
participant motivation and strategies. On the basis of an 
empirical analysis comparing the periods 1998-2001 and 
2002-2006, the authors conclude that short-term factors 
reﬂ  ecting  yield  considerations  have  generally  become 
more important over the years.
(1)    SAUDI ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia, ADNOC in the United Arab Emirates, KPC in 
Kuwait.
(2)    Brent and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) are light oils which are easier to reﬁ  ne. 
Heavy oil is more expensive to reﬁ  ne because it needs additional processing 
(called deep conversion) to produce ordinary products such as petrol.
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The increase in the number of futures contracts for com-
modities  and  the  heightened  price  volatility  led  some 
analysts  to  claim  that  speculators  had  become  more 
capable of inﬂ  uencing prices. The IMF (2006b) tried to 
measure the inﬂ  uence of speculation on the pricing of 
commodities  by  conducting  an  econometric  analysis  of 
the direction of the causality between spot and forward 
price  ﬂ  uctuations  and  changes  in  speculative  positions 
for a sample of products including not only crude oil but 
also copper, sugar, coffee and cotton. That analysis shows 
that the general direction of the causality is from spot 
and forward prices to speculation, and not the other way 
round. Domanski and Heath (2007) mention preliminary 
signs pointing to a positive link between the amount of 
the risk premium and long-term non-commercial positions 
on the oil market. The authors stress that it seems difﬁ  cult 
to reconcile the increases in futures prices up to mid 2006 
with the economic fundamentals. It thus appears that the 
role of speculation requires more research.
3.    Economic impact of oil price 
ﬂ  uctuations
The  movement  in  commodity  prices  has  a  substantial 
inﬂ  uence  on  the  operation  of  the  economy.  Most  of 
the studies which examine the economic effects of the 
recent price increase concentrate their analysis on oil. In 
so doing, they are following a tradition established in the 
wake of the oil crisis of the 1970s. Although the advanced 
countries have since become less dependent on oil, that 
approach highlights the crucial role that this commodity 
still plays in the operation of the economy.
3.1    Theoretical framework
There  is  a  lasting  and  complex  link  between  oil  price 
movements and the economy. At global level, the inﬂ  u-
ence is reciprocal, since the world economic situation also 
determines  the  price  of  this  commodity.  The  economic 
importance of oil is due to the fact that the amount spent 
on this fuel uses up a substantial part of the consump-
tion budget, and oil is generally an essential factor in the 
production process. The theoretical analysis which follows 
looks at the consequences of an increase in the oil price 
for the oil-importing countries.
3.1.1    Effects on inﬂ  ation
All other things being equal, an oil price increase causes 
an almost immediate rise in inﬂ  ation. This “direct effect” 
is due to an increase in the energy component of the 
consumer  price  index.  That  increase  is  then  generally 
extended (at least partially) to other index components 
when ﬁ  rms put up the prices which they charge for goods 
and  services  to  reﬂ  ect  the  increase  in  their  production 
costs which is itself due to the higher oil prices (“indirect 
effect”).
Finally, there may be a second round effect when workers 
try to extract wage increases to compensate, at least in 
part, for the loss of purchasing power which they have 
suffered. If the ﬁ  rms once again adjust their selling prices 
accordingly, that may trigger a wage-price spiral which 
not only augments the upward inﬂ  ationary pressure of an 
oil shock but also makes that pressure more persistent, 
potentially causing households and businesses to adjust 
their inﬂ  ation expectations.
3.1.2    Effects on the real economy
All other things being equal, an increase in the oil price 
generally  causes  economic  growth  to  slow  down.  The 
effects of such a price increase on the real economy are 
felt only gradually, in contrast to the effects on inﬂ  ation.
The increase in the oil price results in a transfer of income 
from  the  oil-importing  to  the  oil-exporting  countries  (1), 
which  depresses  domestic  demand  in  the  importing 
countries.  Conﬁ  dence  and  wealth  effects  may  depress 
domestic  demand  further.  That  effect  is  reinforced  by 
the fact that exports to other oil-importing countries are 
most likely also to be inﬂ  uenced negatively. True, part of 
the higher oil bill can be “recouped” if the oil-exporting 
countries devote part of their additional income to the 
purchase  of  goods  and  services  from  the  oil-importing 
countries.  The  ﬁ  nancial  markets  provide  another  chan-
nel for recycling the “petrodollars” to the oil-importing 
countries, and possibly exerting a moderating effect on 
interest rates.
3.2    Empirical studies
In recent years, many econometric studies have assessed 
the dynamics and the scale of the economic effects of 
oil price shocks. The results of these studies diverge, one 
reason being the wide variety of models used and under-
lying assumptions.
(1)    Attention should also be drawn to the implications of the rising oil prices for the 
global imbalances. In recent years, these have been exacerbated by the persistent 
deterioration in the US current account deﬁ  cit and the marked increase in the 
surpluses of the oil-exporting countries. Those surpluses actually exceeded the 
surpluses of the emerging Asian countries. These developments could mean that 
the global imbalances persist for a longer period.
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A recent assessment by the IMF (2007) states that a dou-
bling of oil prices pushes up global inﬂ  ation by 1.5 per-
centage points and depresses global GDP by 1.4 percent-
age points. A European Commission simulation (2005) of 
a permanent 50 p.c. increase in oil prices shows that the 
impact on inﬂ  ation in the euro area comes to 0.5 percent-
age point in the ﬁ  rst two years. The effect of the higher 
prices on real GDP growth is most marked during the ﬁ  rst 
year, namely minus 0.6 percentage point, and diminishes 
to minus 0.3 and minus 0.2 percentage point during the 
ensuing two years. A National Bank of Belgium estimate 
(2006) of the effect on the Belgian economy of a dou-
bling of the oil price concluded that the upward pressure 
on inﬂ  ation comes to 0.4, 1.1 and 1.2 percentage points 
respectively during the three years covered by the simula-
tion. The downward pressure on economic growth comes 
to minus 0.1, minus 0.5 and minus 0.7 percentage points 
over the same period.
Additional conclusions can be drawn from the results of 
various studies  (1). For instance, the effect of oil shocks is 
asymmetric. In fact, increases in oil prices have a greater 
impact on economic growth (and to a lesser extent on 
inﬂ  ation) than price reductions. This ﬁ  nding may be due 
to downward wage and price rigidities. In addition, alloca-
tion effects on the labour market and uncertainty on the 
ﬁ  nancial markets following oil price ﬂ  uctuations also play 
a role. Another obvious conclusion is that the impact of 
the higher oil prices is more pronounced in the emerging 
countries than in the advanced countries. This is because 
oil is more important to the emerging countries, particu-
larly in view of the greater role of manufacturing industry 
and the generally less modern stock of machinery.
3.3    The moderate economic impact of the current 
oil shock
In  recent  years,  economic  growth  and  inﬂ  ation  in  the 
main oil-importing countries have been relatively resist-
ant to the steep rise in energy prices. In the United States 
and the euro area, although it has edged slowly upwards 
since the late 1990s, inﬂ  ation has remained at a histori-
cally low level so that, contrary to what happened at the 
time of the previous oil shocks, there has been no serious 
increase.  Moreover,  unlike  what  was  seen  at  the  time 
of the two earlier shocks, economic growth has actually 
strengthened in the two regions over the past few years.
There are various factors which may explain the moderate 
effect of the commodity price increases on overall inﬂ  a-
tion in the euro area  (2).
(1)    ECB (2004), IEA (2004), IMF (2005c), OECD (2004), Rogoff (2006).


















































































































































































CHART 5  INFLATION AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE EURO AREA AND IN THE UNITED STATES
  (percentage changes compared to the previous year)
Sources : EC, ECB, Fagan et al (2005), OECD.
(1)  Measured by the consumer price index.
(2)  In volume.
Euro area
United States
INFLATION (1) GDP GROWTH (2)
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The monetary policy framework has changed since the 
1970s, both in the euro area and elsewhere. Since the 
1980s, the central banks of the advanced countries have 
in fact set price stability as their principal objective, and 
they  have  built  up  strong  credibility  enabling  them  to 
anchor inﬂ  ation expectations more securely.
In addition, between 2003 and 2006 most of the euro 
area countries had a negative output gap. Consequently, 
demand  components  added  no  inﬂ  ationary  pressure  at 
all.
Attention should also be drawn to a number of structural 
changes in the euro area. For instance, dependence on 
oil, expressed as the percentage of GDP represented by 
net oil imports, has halved in the past decade. That meas-
ure is inﬂ  uenced by energy-intensity – the efﬁ  ciency of 
energy use – and the proportion of energy needs met by 
imported oil. There are considerable differences between 
countries  regarding  the  level  and  the  evolution  of  oil 
dependence. In the United States, net oil imports are now 
actually higher in relation to GDP than they were in 1970. 
Since the energy intensity of the US economy has declined 
signiﬁ  cantly during that period, the main reason lies in 
lower national oil production : in 1970, the US imported 
just over 20 p.c. of its oil requirements, but in 2005 that 
ﬁ  gure was about 70 p.c. Other structural changes which 
account  for  the  limited  effect  of  the  higher  prices  of 
commodities on overall inﬂ  ation in the euro area include 
greater  budgetary  discipline  and  positive  productivity 
shocks, whether or not due to globalisation.
The advent of the global economy has in fact also had a 
moderating inﬂ  uence on inﬂ  ation. First, the transmission 
of the rise in commodity prices to the later phases in the 
production process was restrained by the stronger com-
petition accompanying globalisation, so that ﬁ  rms ﬁ  nd it 
more difﬁ  cult to increase their selling prices when com-
modities become more expensive. Also, the threat of the 
relocation of production to low-wage countries tended 
to moderate the workers’ wage claims. Finally, with the 
increasing trade with low-wage countries, imports of ﬁ  n-
ished and intermediate products became cheaper. On the 
basis of this last effect and the rise in commodity prices, 
the OECD (2006) calculated the net impact of globalisa-
tion on the change in consumer prices. In the majority of 
the advanced countries, globalisation has caused inﬂ  ation 
to fall – albeit slightly – in the past ﬁ  ve years.
In regard to economic growth, a number of factors have 
similarly helped to limit the adverse repercussions of the 
rising  commodity  prices.  First,  the  global  economy  has 
prospered  in  recent  years,  and  that  has  been  reﬂ  ected 
in  particularly  high  growth  rates.  Moreover,  the  scale 
of the oil shock was less in real terms than that of the 
previous oil shocks. The decline in energy intensity and 
oil dependence has also played a role, as has the pursuit 
of an accommodating monetary policy and the accom-
panying low level of interest rates. Finally, the recycling 
of the “petrodollars” via imports has sustained economic 
growth  in  the  euro  area  and  elsewhere :  imports  from 
the blocs of oil-exporting countries, such as OPEC or the 
CIS, have shown a marked rise in recent years, as those 
countries have spent (part of) their additional oil revenues. 
According to the EC (2006), the recycling of oil revenues 
via imports has been more beneﬁ  cial to the euro area than 
in the 1970s.
4.    Outlook for commodity prices
In view of the signiﬁ  cant impact of commodity prices on 
the  economy,  forecasts  for  those  prices  constitute  vital 
information for the preparation of economic projections 
and for planning and formulating macroeconomic policy.
4.1    In the short and medium term
Projections  over  this  time  span  are  generally  based  on 
commodity prices quoted on futures markets. However, 
the use of these prices to predict price movements is open 
to criticism, both for methodological reasons and because 



















CHART 6  SHARE OF NET IMPORTS OF OIL IN GDP
  (metric tonnes in relation to real GDP, on the basis of 
purchasing power parities, index 1970 = 100)
Sources : IEA, OECD.
United States
Euro area
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of their limited predictive capability  (1). The prices quoted 
recently  on  the  futures  markets  seem  to  indicate  that 
market operators consider the current, historically high, 
oil price level to be a permanent ﬁ  xture. In June 2007, the 
ﬁ  nancial markets expected the oil price to continue rising 
slowly until mid 2008 and then to subside somewhat.
The recent projections produced by international organi-
sations also expect the high oil prices to persist in the 
years ahead. Thus, the IMF (2007) predicts that, on an 
annual basis, the average price of oil will fall by 5.5 p.c. in 
2007 and increase by 6.6 p.c. in 2008. Moreover, in the 
opinion of that organisation, the risk factors applicable 
to oil prices are still on the upside. The latest detailed 
  projections  by  the  IEA  (World  Energy  Outlook,  2006) 
indicate  a  slight  fall  in  oil  prices  during  the  period 
2007-2009  owing  to  the  combined  effects  of  expand-
ing supply and a slackening growth rate of the demand. 
However, at the same time the IEA draws attention to 
the persistence of geopolitical risks and the supply dis-
ruptions which could push prices up. The IEA warns in a 
later publication (IEA, 2007) for an increasing scarcity on 
the oil market after 2010. According to that organisation, 
oil prices will remain subject to upward pressure in the 
coming years.







































































































































































































































CHART 7  SPOT AND FORWARD PRICES OF CRUDE OIL AND SOME MAJOR METALS
  (monthly averages, US dollar)
Sources : ICE, IMF, LME, Thomson Financial Datastream.
(1)  Futures contracts traded on the ICE (oil) and the LME (metals).
OIL 








Forward prices, June 2007 
(1)
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Prices quoted on the futures markets in some important 
metals  (aluminium,  copper  and  zinc)  indicate  that  the 
outlook for these metal prices over the next two years 
differs somewhat from that for oil. Prices of these metals 
are expected to fall fairly sharply in the years ahead. That 
pattern is in line with past movements in metal prices. In 
the medium term, metal prices in fact move in parallel 
with the production costs of marginal producers, namely 
those who are the least efﬁ  cient. However, in periods of 
booming economic activity, and hence an acute market 
shortage, market prices may be well in excess of those 
costs, but later subside fairly rapidly to their equilibrium 
level, since additional production capacity can be mobi-
lised quite quickly. In view of the current gap between 
the  market  price  and  the  equilibrium  price,  prices  can 
therefore be expected to fall. Various international organi-
sations (including the IMF and the World Bank) agree with 
that point of view. According to those organisations, the 
contraction of demand caused by the price rises seen in 
recent years and the expansion of supply resulting from 
increased investment are likely to play a key role in the 
expected reduction in prices.
4.2    In the long term
According  to  the  IEA’s  reference  scenario  in  the  World 
Energy  Outlook  2006,  demand  for  oil  will  increase 
by  1.3  p.c.  per  annum  during  the  period  2005-2030, 
  compared  to  1.1  p.c.  per  annum  during  the  period 
1981-2004. The rise is expected to be most marked in 
the non-OECD countries, with annual growth predicted at 
2.3 p.c. The substantial wealth creation and the accom-
panying  sharp  rise  in  car  ownership  expected  in  those 
countries are the main factors. In the advanced countries, 
the expansion of demand is expected to be only 0.6 p.c. 
per annum during the period 2005-2030. The continuing 
decline  in  energy  intensity  and  the  measures  taken  to 
combat the greenhouse effect should curb the growth of 
consumption in those countries. As a result, the consump-
tion of non-OECD countries is expected to exceed that of 
the OECD countries by the end of the projection period.
The oil supply is determined by the level of remaining oil 
resources and the degree to which those are extracted 
and marketed.
The estimates of oil resources still available are surrounded 
by uncertainty owing to differences in methods of calcu-
lation, political interests and the fact that a number of 
regions  have  not  yet  been  examined  for  the  presence 
of oil.
These  remaining  oil  resources  are  an  important  factor 
inﬂ  uencing  future  production  potential  and  prices. 
However, it is difﬁ  cult to estimate precisely the level of 
future production since, apart from the uncertainty over 
remaining oil resources, it is also necessary to take account 
Oil resources
The IEA deﬁ  nitions distinguish between conventional and non-conventional oil (1). Conventional oil is deﬁ  ned as 
the oil which can be produced from underground reservoirs by means of traditional wells. It comprises several 
categories (2). The ﬁ  rst consists of the proven reserves. These comprise the oil which has been discovered and 
is expected to be economically viable to extract. At the end of 2004, the IEA has estimated those reserves at 
1,106 billion barrels, which would last for about another 40 years at the current rate of production. Second, there 
is the expected increase in reserves resulting from technological progress, which boosts the recovery rate in existing 
oil ﬁ  elds, or from new information on these ﬁ  elds. These reserves are estimated at 308 billion barrels. The third 
category comprises resources which have not yet been discovered. These are estimated at 883 billion barrels. The 
conventional oil resources thus total 2,297 billion barrels.
Non-conventional oil is technically far more difﬁ  cult to produce, so that the production costs are much higher 
than for conventional oil, and the economic viability of its extraction is more dubious. In addition, the adverse 
environmental impact of producing non-conventional oil is greater. These resources are estimated at around 
7,000 billion barrels. Non-conventional oil comprises : extra-heavy oil, oil shale, natural bitumen and tar sands.
(1)    The conventional oil resources also include natural gas liquids.
(2)    The IEA’s World Energy Outlook for 2004 and that for 2005 were used as the source for the ﬁ  gures on conventional oil resources.
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of factors inﬂ  uencing investment and development con-
ditions in the countries where the deposits are located. 
Thus, a recent American study  (1) estimates that around 
85 p.c. of the world’s proven oil reserves are located in 
countries where the investment risks are considerable or 
where foreign investment is prohibited.
Estimates  of  future  oil  supplies  vary  widely  depending 
on  the  organisations  which  produce  them.  A  number 
of observers, including the IEA, predict further increases 
in production in line with demand up to the end of the 
projection  period  in  2030.  Conversely,  other  analysts 
expect production to peak before that date and decline 
subsequently.  That  view  conforms  to  the  “production 
peak” theory introduced in the 1950s by the American 
geologist M.K. Hubbert and applied to United States oil 
production. Since then, that theory has also been applied 
to other countries or regions, and in recent years it has 
also  been  used  to  predict  the  global  production  peak. 
Estimates of the timing of that peak vary widely, and fall 
roughly between 2005 and 2040. In the IEA’s projection, 
the market shares of the OPEC countries increase from 
41 p.c. in 2005 to 48 p.c. in 2030  (2).
According to the IEA’s reference scenario oil prices in real 
terms  should  decline  gradually  up  to  2012,  and  then 
increase, owing to the combined effect of rising marginal 
production costs in non-OPEC countries and the expand-
ing market share of the OPEC countries in total output  (3). 
Nevertheless, oil prices are expected to remain below the 
level reached in 2006. However, the OPEC countries have 
nothing to gain from excessively high prices, since in that 
case, global demand would contract, it would become 
more attractive to use alternative energy sources and it 
would become proﬁ  table to exploit hitherto undeveloped 
oil  deposits,  situated  mainly  outside  the  cartel.  It  must 
be stressed that this prediction is based on a continuous 
increase in oil production over the projection period. If the 
rise in oil output is slower, or if production peaks during 
that period, that will exert additional upward pressure on 
prices. On the basis of these ﬁ  ndings and other projec-
tions, it can be said that there is a fairly broad consensus 
that oil prices will remain high over the next few decades 
in comparison with the pre-2002 period.
(1)    United States Government Accountability Ofﬁ  ce (2007).
(2)    This increase in the “call on OPEC” is due largely to the assumptions underlying 
the projection and is subject to criticism (cf. in particular Boussena, Pauwels, 
Locatelli and Swartenbroekx, 2006).
(3)    The latest EIA projection relating to the international energy market, dated 





















































































































CHART 8  GLOBAL OIL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
  (millions of barrels per day)
Sources : EIA, IEA.
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It is important to point out that this price scenario may 
prompt  a  number  of  structural  adjustments  on  the  oil 
market and on the energy markets. On the supply side, 
high  prices  may  encourage  investment  in  exploration, 
production, transport and reﬁ  ning of oil, and enhance the 
attractions of alternative energy sources. On the demand 
side, high prices may lead to greater energy efﬁ  ciency. 
Such developments are likely to exert downward pressure 
on prices.
In  the  case  of  metal  prices,  the  long-term  projections 
should take account of a number of characteristics typi-
cal of this market, different from those of oil. First, the 
supply of these commodities is virtually inexhaustible, and 
a number of metals can be recycled. Next, the market 
structure is competitive. Also, investments are quicker to 
result in increased production. These factors limit the risk 
of structurally high metal prices, even in cases where a 
substantial increase in demand is expected. However, it 
is currently hard to predict whether the above-mentioned 
historical  downward  trend  in  metal  prices,  namely  the 
decline of 1.5 p.c. per annum in real terms over the period 
1971-2002,  will  continue  in  the  future.  According  to 
the World Bank (2006b), it is possible that the structural 
increase in certain production costs in the metal sector, 
particularly  the  energy  costs,  may  halt  this  downward 
trend and cause prices to remain above the low levels 
reached in the later 1990s.
5.    Economic policy implications
High and volatile oil prices have an adverse effect on the 
economy. Moreover, the use of oil as the main source of 
energy is contributing to global warming. Governments 
therefore  clearly  have  a  role  to  play  in  the  energy 
debate.
The experiences of the 1970s, however, have shown that 
an  excessively  accommodating  monetary  policy,  which 
tries  to  attenuate  the  consequences  of  higher  energy 
costs, does not produce the expected result : quite the 
contrary. Even in the case of an oil shock, it is essential 
for the monetary authorities to adhere to their objective 
of  medium-term  price  stability,  otherwise  the  unavoid-
able temporary increase in inﬂ  ation will become ﬁ  xed in 
the inﬂ  ation expectations of the economic agents, lead-
ing to higher wage demands which will in turn drive up 
inﬂ  ation. The economy would thus become trapped in a 
price-wage spiral.
Price regulation, aimed at compensating for the higher oil 
prices by ﬁ  scal measures, e.g. by reducing the taxes on 
petroleum products, is not advisable either, since it has 
the disadvantage of disrupting the pricing mechanism and 
thus delaying the adjustment of demand, for example via 
energy  saving  measures.  In  addition,  if  their  budgetary 
cost is high, ﬁ  scal measures to compensate for prices may 
also increase the vulnerability of the budget position and 
augment the effect of high oil prices at macroeconomic 
level, when these measures ultimately prove to be unsus-
tainable and have to be cancelled.
On the other hand, governments may consider a number 
of structural measures designed to limit the risks associ-
ated with serious production disruption and to guarantee 
a stable energy supply.
First,  action  may  be  taken  to  expand  and  improve  the 
information available on the oil markets. It has repeat-
edly been found that the information currently available 
is often incomplete, inaccurate and supplied too late. In 
recent years, progress has been made in this direction, 
as a result of the JODI project, initiated jointly by seven 
international organisations  (1).
Next,  strategic  reserves  should  be  maintained  at  an 
adequate  level.  In  that  regard,  the  IEA  recommends  a 
level of reserves corresponding to 90 days’ net imports. 
Governments  can  also  eliminate  any  barriers  to  invest-
ment, and try to conclude long-term contracts with oil 
suppliers.
Finally, the oil-consuming countries can continue looking 
for ways of making energy consumption more efﬁ  cient, 
and diversifying their sources of supply in order to reduce 
their dependence on oil and gas. In this connection, the 
problem of the lack of alternatives to oil-based fuels for 
motor vehicles is of vital importance. There are also ways 
of continuing to reduce energy intensity in industry and 
in households. A period of high oil prices may be a good 
time to take such measures.
A number of initiatives have recently been taken in Europe 
to deﬁ  ne a coordinated energy policy. Thus, the March 
2007 European Council presented a draft Energy Policy 
for Europe (EPE), integrated with a climate policy  (2). It was 
based on recommendations by the European Commission 
(2007)  published  at  the  beginning  of  this  year  in  the 
Strategic Energy Review. The main points of the energy 
policy are : security of energy supplies ; maintenance of 
the competitiveness of the European economy, notably 
by investing in energy efﬁ  ciency (the aim is to achieve a 
20 p.c. improvement by 2020), renewable energy (the aim 
is to increase the share of such energy to 20 p.c. by 2020) 
(1)    APEC, Eurostat, IEA, IEFS, OLADE, OPEC, UNSD.
(2)    Council of the European Union (2007).
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and new technologies ; encouraging respect for the envi-
ronment and combating global warming (reducing CO2 
emissions to 20 p.c. below their 1990 levels by 2020).
As a ﬁ  rst concrete step in the creation of the EPE and 
in  anticipation  of  further  action,  the  European  Council 
adopted a global energy plan for the period 2007-2009. 
The progress and results of the energy action plan will 
undergo annual assessment by the European Council. The 
Commission was asked to update the Strategic Energy 
Review by the beginning of 2009. That update will be 
used as the basis for a new energy action plan to take 
effect in 2010.
Conclusion
The commodity markets have become the focus of close 
attention on account of the steep rise in prices, particu-
larly since 2003. In nominal terms, the prices of oil and 
most metals have reached historically high levels, and in 
real terms they have reached their highest levels since the 
early eighties.
The recent increase is due mainly to a substantial expan-
sion in demand for commodities. That reﬂ  ects the vigour 
of global economic growth in recent years, and particu-
larly the increasing integration of a substantial proportion 
of  the  world’s  population  in  the  global  economy  and 
international trade.
The rising price of oil is due partly to a series of develop-
ments on the supply side. The historically strong growth 
of demand for oil recorded in 2004 in combination with 
a deceleration in the growth of non-OPEC countries pro-
duction thus put a strain on the oil market. In response, 
the OPEC countries adopted an accommodating attitude 
by producing at almost maximum capacity until the end of 
2004. The following years, OPEC production remained at 
a high level. The excess production capacity dropped to a 
very low level, so that oil prices were inﬂ  uenced by every 
change which had a negative impact on the oil supply, 
such as the regular recurrence of geopolitical tensions.
The ﬁ  gures for economic growth and inﬂ  ation show that 
the  oil-importing  countries  have  stood  up  well  to  the 
increasing  oil  price  in  recent  years.  The  change  in  the 
monetary policy system compared to the 1970s, a number 
of  structural  changes  taking  place  in  the  advanced 
economies, the beneﬁ  cial effects of globalisation and the 
favourable economic climate are the main contributory 
factors.
Looking to the immediate future, on the basis of the for-
ward prices quoted, market operators consider that the 
high oil prices currently prevailing are structural. In the 
long term, according to the latest IEA forecasts, demand 
for oil is expected to increase between 2005 and 2030 by 
an average of 1.3 p.c. per annum, with a similar increase 
in production, stepping up the “call on OPEC“. The IEA 
is thus in the optimists’ camp, as many analysts actually 
expect  production  to  peak  before  2030.  The  IEA  –  in 
common with the majority of other observers – expects 
oil prices to remain at a high level over the next few dec-
ades. There are some factors which may temper the trend 
in prices. Thus, high prices could depress demand for oil 
(efforts to improve energy efﬁ  ciency, search for alternative 
sources of energy) and make it proﬁ  table to exploit oil 
ﬁ  elds hitherto undeveloped. Metal price forecasts predict 
moderation of the current high level, mainly because of 
the ﬂ  exibility of supply, as the production capacity can be 
increased quite rapidly.
Owing to the major economic impact of high and volatile 
oil prices and growing concern over the environmental 
consequences of energy consumption, governments have 
a key role to play in the energy debate. In recent years, 
there have been a number of European initiatives aimed 
at  creating  a  common  European  energy  and  climate 
policy. For instance, in March 2007, the European Council 
adopted an Energy Policy for Europe (EPE), which was put 
into practice in the form of an energy action plan for the 
period 2007-2009.
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